To evaluate, counter-intuit. The purposes of the subsidies

It is well known that in the Islands we have heavily subsidized mobility. Is this the way to supposedly compensate for the costs of insularity? I am not sure that it is. Does the fact that the intercity bus is free for users help make goods cheaper? I would rather say no, to the extent that it inflates demand. Perhaps transport does not have to cover costs in full with its fares, but it is good that we all know the cost of things and what the objective of the reduction is. And, as we have learned with the elimination of tolls, zero cost does not exist: someone else is paying for it. I also do not see the current operation of discounts on ship and plane transport for island residents as being at all clear, when we should instead focus on freight rates if anything. Certainly, transport discounts are on the backs of all Spaniards, in the same way that the deficits of peninsular trains that we islanders do not have are also partly at our expense. But this second justification does not make the first one good. It also makes no sense that, given the subsidies, the taxi transfer from the airport ends up being more expensive than the plane ticket. I do not see in all assumptions sufficient evaluated evidence of positive externalities for such subsidized mobility, nor a sufficient argument for equity, in view of who its greatest beneficiaries are. And the fact is that I verify that there are many false residents who register in the Islands without effectively living there. They are processes of almost free choice, with little cost to those who exercise them, and which benefit the most clever, who are usually the most well-off. Recently this effect has also been verified with the free choice of doctor in the Spanish healthcare system. The richest and most educated know how to take better advantage of it. The lack of effective control otherwise incentivizes the abuse of subsidies. It would be better to have a subsidy system that establishes blackout dates; for example, at the point of origin, entries to the Islands on peninsular long weekends or weekends, and the equivalent at the destination for the same residents traveling to the Peninsula, or setting a lower percentage of subsidy in these mentioned cases. And to prevent companies from taking advantage of it by selectively increasing the prices to which the discount is applied. A fake resident suffers, currently only, as a cost of their fraudulent choice, the fact of not having a primary care physician in the place of effective residence. But the fact that this does not matter already tells us that it is about fairly wealthy people who probably have private insurance and do not use public primary care. With the upcoming limitation of vehicle entries in the summer, it is also necessary to analyze the measure with a magnifying glass regarding the cars of fake residents who pay circulation taxes outside the Islands. And, of course, the large car rental multinationals that seasonally bring in huge fleets of vehicles that have paid taxes outside of our home.However, I do not think some penalties are bad, such as the fact that the fees for some services, such as waste collection, for example, do not distinguish based on the lower use of holiday homes, since the fixed part of the cost and maintenance, more or less, depends on the peaks in demand for which those non-residents are equally decisive. I do believe that volume should have a significant influence on businesses, especially those that are highly seasonal, as they are the ones that set the maximum installed capacity to meet peak demand. Certainly, the regulation of fees, unlike public prices, cannot have net collection effects, but only cost recovery. But if this applies to the full cost of the service, it is necessary to check how this amount is reached, since important issues of efficiency and equitable distribution are at stake. Everything mentioned implies the need to evaluate the measures, particularly the populist ones, as they often have effects different from those postulated. The latest one from the current Spanish government, which extends to 52 years the age of exit from the market for those already considered non-relocatable, with a guaranteed income and a pre-established pension, is an unequivocal case. This measure harms many of those who still strive to work and provide for their own pension by paying contributions that ensure minimum periods, paid out of pocket as the self-employed that they are, even during periods without income. It would be better for them to quit given what they earn and that theirs will be a lower pension than those who have stopped working and live on subsidies and what they can collect from activities without an invoice.