The geopolitics of silence

There are neighbors with whom we try never to argue. Not because they are always right, nor because they are stronger, but because we know that a fight can cost us too much. Something like this happens between Spain and Morocco. Only here we are not talking about a partition wall or a piece of garden, but about borders, migration, trade, security, Ceuta, Melilla and Western Sahara.Over the last few years, Pedro Sánchez's government has opted to almost always avoid open confrontation with Rabat. Sometimes this attitude seems like a geopolitics of silence: lowering the tone, absorbing tensions and preserving, above all else, a functional relationship with Mohammed VI. The question is whether this prudence strengthens the Spanish state or if, little by little, it makes it more vulnerable.It is not a question of military strength. Spain continues to be far superior to Morocco in global terms. It is part of the European Union and NATO, it has more complete armed forces, a much larger economy, and a naval and aerial capacity that Rabat cannot match. Spanish military spending reached 40.2 billion dollars in 2025, according to SIPRI – Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. This figure represents a 50% increase compared to 2024 and places Spain among the fifteen countries that spend the most on the military in the world.Therefore, a direct military confrontation against Spain would be extraordinarily risky for Morocco. But relations between states are not decided solely by planes, frigates, or divisions. Deterrence is more subtle: it consists of making the other believe that certain actions will have too high a price. And it is precisely here that the problem arises.Morocco has learned to move in a terrain that is neither that of complete peace nor that of open conflict. A gray zone that includes migration control, customs, police cooperation, fishing, the Sahara, and statements regarding Ceuta and Melilla. There is no need to threaten Spain; sometimes it is enough to stop doing something that is usually done. Obviously, it has its back well covered by the USA.The Ceuta crisis of May 2021 demonstrated this with a clarity that is hard to forget. In the midst of diplomatic tension over the hospitalization in Spain of Brahim Ghali, leader of the Polisario Front, thousands of people crossed the border while Moroccan control was extraordinarily reduced. In a few hours, a diplomatic crisis turned into a border, humanitarian, and political crisis.A year later, the great Spanish change regarding Western Sahara arrived. In March 2022, Sánchez described the Moroccan autonomy proposal as the most serious, realistic, and credible basis for resolving the conflict. That move allowed for the reconstruction of the relationship with Rabat, but it caused a serious crisis with Algeria and meant abandoning the balance that Spain had maintained for decades between the two great neighbors of the Maghreb.By the way, we must remember Pedro Sánchez's visit last July to Algeria, which is not talked about much. But it is certainly true that it caused a stomach ache in Rabat and for Mohammed VI.President Sánchez, with a juggling act he likes so much, tried to rebuild the balance with Algiers without undoing what he had agreed with Rabat. Spain did not withdraw its support for the Moroccan autonomy plan for the Sahara. He was attempting something difficult: to maintain a privileged relationship with Morocco and, simultaneously, to recover Algeria.And there are powerful arguments for it to be this way. Spain is Morocco's main trading partner and bilateral exchanges exceed 22.5 billion euros annually. Hundreds of Spanish companies operate in the country. To this are added counter-terrorism cooperation, the fight against drug trafficking, migration control, and the joint organization of the 2030 Football World Cup.Therefore, it would be too easy to define Sánchez's policy as a simple submission. For any Spanish government, having a stable and cooperative Morocco is a matter of national security. The problem begins when cooperation and dependence are confused.Here a paradox appears. Spain has much more global power than Morocco, but Rabat has a great capacity to cause immediate problems. It can relax border controls, hinder police cooperation, or raise the tone regarding Ceuta and Melilla and generate political consequences in a matter of hours.Madrid, on the other hand, needs time. It has to mobilize the European Union, activate diplomacy, seek support, or adopt economic measures. This difference gives Morocco a tactical advantage, even if Spain has a strategic superiority.The Ceuta migration crisis of July 2026 has brought this reality back to the table. Pedro Sánchez has stated that there is no conclusive evidence that the Moroccan government deliberately organized that massive entry. At the same time, it has been noted that, during some decisive hours, border control was much lower than usual. Everything suggests that we don't know half the story. We analyze based on what they tell us and what they don't tell us, but which we glimpse or intuit. The visit to Algiers on July 20th has cost the State and the national government dearly, hasn't it?Ceuta and Melilla are the other great element of this equation. Morocco maintains its historical claim. Spain considers their sovereignty indisputable. A military operation against either of the two cities would be highly unlikely because it would trigger an international crisis of enormous dimensions. But Rabat does not need a war to keep the issue alive; it can wait. Spanish governments think in terms of legislatures. The Moroccan monarchy can think in terms of decades.Therefore, the true Spanish vulnerability today is not an invasion of Ceuta or Melilla. It is everything that can happen without reaching a military aggression: migratory pressure, diplomatic crises, commercial disputes, border tensions, and territorial claims. It is the grey zone. And it is here where an important part of the relationship between Madrid and Rabat is decided.Spain needs Morocco. Morocco also needs Spain and Europe. The relationship is one of interdependence, but it is not completely symmetrical. Intelligent policy probably does not consist of seeking a confrontation with Rabat. It would be irresponsible. But it also cannot consist of conveying that any pressure will be absorbed in silence.The media, the networks, the fights and the threats in Congress are often noise and circumstantial matters. Nor has the parliamentary opposition known how to turn this issue into a State debate. Too often, electoral interests and the struggle for power have taken precedence over serious reflection on Spain's foreign policy.In conclusion, the underlying question is whether Morocco still believes that pressuring Spain has a high price or if it thinks it comes cheap to them.Do not forget the phrase by Manuel Vicent in El País, on July 9, 2023, referring to Pedro Sánchez: “… Volvió a la sede caracoleando sobre una jaca torda para tomar el mando".