No, the green wave did not cause Bauzà to lose the elections.
Sometimes you hear or read that the PP's resounding electoral defeat in the Balearic Islands in 2015 was a direct consequence of the popular uprising against the aberrant anti-Catalan policies of José Ramón Bauzá's government. No, that wasn't it.
Had things unfolded as this supposition suggests, the election results would have shown a clear Balearic specificity and, therefore, a significant difference from the results in the other regional elections. However, the outcome was almost the same everywhere: the PP's collapse—due to the very serious economic situation and, to a lesser extent, corruption—the spectacular emergence of Podemos with unexpected strength, the resounding presence of Ciudadanos, the slight decline of the PSOE, and, in some peripheral regions, the rise of progressive nationalism, which neither compensated the conservatives nor was needed by the progressives to govern. And as for the results by bloc, an absolute victory for the left.
No, there was no island-specific effect due to the anti-Bauzá sentiment. In fact, the domestic results followed the trend already observed in 2011 and so clearly confirmed subsequently: the high degree of similarity between islanders and those from the Valencian Community and Aragon.
The party structure is the same: the PP and PSOE as the main forces, far ahead of the rest, which are made up of their competitors and—if necessary—albeit their respective partners: Vox and, on the left, the entire communist constellation—Podem, PCE-IU; and, in addition, the distinct local character of the peripheral regions: progressive nationalism—Compromís, Chunta, and the two MÁS parties—and regionalism—PI, PAR, Existe—which presents the only difference in Valencia compared to the other two territories because there is no electoral offering from this sector since the demise of Unió Valenciana. Another characteristic that unites the three regions is the growing importance of voting on national issues, despite the existence of the aforementioned local parties. Furthermore, for the last 15 years, ideological blogs have been winning or losing simultaneously; perhaps that's not a long enough time to consider the structural trend a given, but neither is it merely an anecdotal occurrence.
The electoral performance of each party is also highly consistent, with slight variations. The PP's support increases or decreases simultaneously across the board, but in the Balearic Islands, it consistently shows a positive differential compared to the overall results, achieving the same level in the other two territories—and in the general elections, it surpasses the Spanish average—by between 1 and 2 percentage points. The PSOE similarly rises or falls in parallel, but its Balearic differential is negative, between 1 and 4 points. The third-largest party, Vox, maintains an average in the Islands that is 2.5 points higher than in Aragon and 2 points higher than in Valencia. As for the non-nationalist left wing of the PSOE, its performance is directly in line with the general average. On the other hand, left-wing nationalism always operates in conjunction with the PSOE, and regionalism has lost the presence it once had in all three territories. It is nonexistent in the Balearic and Valencian parliaments and significantly reduced in Aragon.
If, therefore, the political situation in terms of party structure is the same as in Aragon, if the results by bloc are the same, and so similar are the specific party acronyms, what can we expect to happen in the Balearic Islands after what we saw happen at the Aragonese polls last Sunday?
It doesn't seem too bold to suggest that the right-wing majority will further widen the left-wing representation. It could even do so more than it did in 2023, thus equaling—or perhaps even surpassing—the PP's landslide victory in 2011, when they won 35 of the 59 seats. Aragon has almost extinguished any hope of a progressive victory in the Balearic Islands in 2027. Only an event with a brutal political impact—unimaginable at present—could prevent it.
Another matter entirely is how the PP and Vox will reach an agreement, if they do at all. It will depend on the overall strategy imposed—as always—by the leadership of the far-right national movement. No local elements will have any influence.
What is beyond doubt is that if a new post-election alliance between the two right-wing parties were to materialize, it wouldn't be like the one they formed in 2023, when the neo-fascists were very inexperienced and didn't know how to maneuver against a PP very accustomed to the sleight of hand of politics. On the contrary, now the far-right are veterans and aware of their considerable strength against the conservatives. So it would be logical to expect that the price they would make Prohens pay would be much higher than it was then, especially on issues of urban planning, language, immigration, and historical amnesia.
