Jordi Borràs: "The far right has been able to capitalize on the failure of social democracy."

PalmCatalan photographer and journalist Jordi Borràs (Barcelona, ​​1981) has spent years documenting the country's social and political conflicts, with a particular focus on the far right and ultra-right movements in Catalonia and throughout Europe. He has photographically documented numerous demonstrations and public events held by all kinds of far-right organizations and groups for nearly 16 years. As a result of his work as a photojournalist, Borràs has received threats from ultra-right and fascist groups such as the National Democracy party, among others. Borràs is the author of the books Warcelona: A History of Violence (Polen editions, 2013), Dismantling Catalan Civil Society(Saldonar Editions, 2015), Plus ultra: A graphic chronicle of Spanishism in Catalonia (Polen Edicions, 2015) and Days that will last for years(Ahora Libros, 2018). This is an uncomfortable and forceful work that focuses the debate on the limits of freedom of expression, political violence, and the role of photojournalism in democratic denunciation.

Since the pandemic, it seems that the far right is on the rise among young people and not-so-young people. What are the reasons for this?

— Several factors influence this. One is a global wave, from which we cannot escape, that has propelled the far right forward like wildfire in just a few years. This is largely due to the failure of social democracy, as the traditional right, along with the center-left, has alternated in power through a two-party system for decades, without addressing many of the problems affecting the majority of the population. Thus, instead of a left-wing alternative consolidating—in some places, like Spain, one did emerge a few years ago, but ultimately failed to adapt to the system—much of this discontent has been capitalized on by the far right. That said, it is also true that during the pandemic, in a context of social isolation and with the help of new technologies, which have kept us hyperconnected, the transmission of ideas via mobile phones and computers has been greatly facilitated. All of this has facilitated the dissemination of discourses andinfluencers typical of the far right.

Why are these content creators with ties to the far right emerging?

— Several points need to be made here. One of them is that the combination of social networks – especially certain platforms – and influencers The far-right's orbit works very well. Even in their speeches. This is because, ultimately, the far right is based on very short and simple messages. This doesn't mean there isn't an intellectual foundation behind it that knows perfectly well how to synthesize them. It's important to dismantle the myth that the far right is made up of intellectually incapable people, because this isn't true.

What are these speeches based on?

— These are generally brief, very specific messages that usually focus on two or three key themes. For example, immigration and crime, which are always linked in these speeches. Other frequent themes revolve around turbo-capitalism, which the far right has embraced for some years now as a response to any proposal for wealth redistribution. That is to say, individualism, entrepreneurship, cryptocurrencies, etc., and above all, the inculcation of the idea of ​​'every man for himself'.

How does this take root among young people?

— If we add to all of this the fact that, during the pandemic, young people suffered unprecedented isolation and were forced to connect through screens—at least, much more than usual—the picture becomes clearer. Social media isn't new, but the pandemic accelerated and intensified these kinds of relationships. All of this creates a cocktail that has led us to a situation where a significant portion of young people—by no means a majority—around 20%, place themselves within the far-right ideological spectrum, especially among young men. There is also a percentage of young people who don't place themselves anywhere ideologically, but it's worth noting that 60% move in the exact opposite direction, with discourses typical of the alternative left or anti-establishment movements. Therefore, this 20% shouldn't make us lose sight of the bigger picture: among young people, there is a very important group who want to change the world and who are the complete opposite of what the far right proposes. We're talking about solidarity, commitment, and collectivity. It is often a militant antifascism in everyday practice, although not necessarily linked to a specific organization. It is an antifascism inherent in their attitudes.

What is the leitmotiv What is the current state of the far right? In what areas is it most organized?

— The factors that socialize the far right have changed over time. In the 1980s and 90s, there were two key spaces for recruiting new members: football stadiums and concerts. Today, this has changed radically. The main space for socialization is now social media, which, moreover, fosters isolation and individualism. The far right's success on social media is explained by its affinity for very short messages that are easy to understand and, above all, difficult to refute, because there is no dialogue. Someone tells you how things are, how you should be, how to dress, and even how to think. There is no exchange of ideas, and this disappearance of community is one of its greatest dangers.

How have social spaces evolved with the growing importance of networks?

— As I was saying, the spaces for socialization have changed profoundly because of social media. Perhaps we shouldn't even talk about social networks anymore, because the real exchange of ideas and positions is no longer what it was fifteen years ago. It might be more accurate to speak of content platforms, because the concept of a social network is becoming somewhat obsolete. This cosmos of socialization is now global. Obviously, it affects politics, but also the academic and educational spheres. Just look at the fundamentalist Catholic groups occupying schools or groups of Catholic schools in cities like Barcelona. We should ask ourselves what the consequences are of teenagers and young adults growing up with ideologies close to the most fundamentalist Catholicism. The economic environment is another space where these ideas thrive. In reality, the far right is organized within our society. We often forget that it has been working quietly for many years, and now we are paying the price for having underestimated it. The emergence of parties like Vox and Aliança Catalana is a direct consequence of this.

How does one move from the socialization of ideas to the formation of political parties?

— Before the emergence of these parties, there was already a whole set of ideas that had clearly influenced people's thinking. This is what in France they call the lepenization of spiritsLittle by little, people are modifying their value system almost without realizing it, accepting—and even reproducing—increasingly xenophobic and economically ultraliberal discourses where humanism disappears. All of this is transforming collective thinking. Therefore, when a party of this kind runs in an election, it usually succeeds to a greater or lesser degree, because often the demand has preceded the supply. For this reason, when they run, even with puppet candidates—especially at the local level—they gain representation without too much difficulty. In this case, people don't vote so much for the person but rather cast a visceral vote: a vote based on a supposed feeling of loss, betrayal, fear, hatred, and frustration that ultimately facilitates the rise of the far right.

While the far right continues to display historically fascist symbols, its political wing seems to choose to hide them. Is that so?

— From a parliamentary perspective, the far right has abandoned the symbolic rhetoric that might identify it with the genocidal regimes of the interwar period, especially in Europe. It has done so because it needed to establish this ideological distance in order to reinvent and reshape itself. In Spain, for example, Vox did not begin to grow until it made clear that it was not a party born from the ashes of late Francoism, as Fuerza Nueva had been after the dictator's death (1975), which unabashedly championed a Francoism without Franco. Vox emerged as a splinter group from the People's Party (PP), which itself originated from the former People's Alliance, co-founded by seven former Francoist ministers. Therefore, there is a past directly linked to Francoism.

— The People's Party (PP) also had leaders from the Falange and other far-right groups. Their parliamentary position was often ambiguous because of their background, but formally they couldn't be categorized as far-right, even though they promoted policies typical of that political spectrum. As for Vox, especially in its early days, they were very careful with symbolism, particularly at public events: they avoided Francoist flags and raised arms, because they couldn't afford to fall into the trap of claiming an ideology perceived as dead. They learned this from the experience of other countries like France, Germany, Austria, and much of Europe. Another factor to consider is that these groups usually have a militant Nazi-fascist party or association alongside them, which serves them well in whitewashing their image and portraying these groups as the true fascists and radicals. We could say that throughout Europe, the far right operates on two levels: the grassroots and the institutional.

Are there several families within the far right?

— Yes. There is a clearly far-right family, which is the militant Nazi-fascist one, and then there is the extreme right, which can be divided into two branches and which, in many cases, justifies the violence of the far right. On the one hand, there is the populist radical right, where we would find groups like Alternative for Germany, National Rally, or Catalan Alliance. On the other, there is the conservative radical right, which usually has a national-Catholic foundation, like Vox, the Hungarian Fidesz, and the Law and Justice party in Poland, with substantial differences compared to the other family. These two are the political arm of the far-right spectrum. In the case of the Spanish state, the militant ultra-right group would currently be National Nucleus, but previously it was also Hogar Social.

Are the ultras the ones who use the most symbolism?

— Yes, far-right groups use it unabashedly. Some of the most common symbols are Celtic crosses, of neo-fascist origin, which appeared in France in the second half of the 20th century. Also, the Cross of Burgundy, in the Spanish case, which the entire far right uses, from the most Nazi-fascist to Vox. They justify it by saying it's a symbol used by the Spanish army and the monarchy. This is where the perversion of symbols also comes into play. For example, in the case of Aliança Catalana, they have perverted the use of the old Catalan flag, the Cross of Saint George, a national symbol of the country. The Francoist eagle is another symbol, although it is increasingly falling out of use. Furthermore, the logo of Núcleo Nacional imitates the Nazi symbol of the Wolfsangel.

Is Spanish nationalism the common thread among the far right?

— Yes, it's a thesis I've defended for many years and developed in several books. Plus ultraMy second book already addressed this idea. Let me give you an example: the demonstration with the greatest diversity and presence of far-right groups in Spain since Franco's death—which I have documented—was the one that took place in Barcelona in October 2017, a week after the referendum. I even counted the number of groups and splinter groups that participated, and it was staggering: they were all there. From Vox to Plataforma per Catalunya and Democracia Nacional, including demonstrators alongside the PP, Ciutadans, and even members of the PSOE. Therefore, yes: Spanish nationalism, and specifically anti-Catalanism—and often Catalanophobia as well—is the great catalyst for the Spanish far right. Catalan nationalism is perceived as the embodiment of 'anti-Spain,' a concept born in the 19th century to define internal enemies: socialists, anarchists, nudists, libertarians, and, of course, Catalan nationalists. It seems that they are much more afraid of a possible independence of Catalonia or the Catalan Countries, and that is why they have dedicated so much effort to dividing, fragmenting and promoting secessionism.

How can we understand the logic between fascism, which partly rejects the modern world, and the most savage form of capitalism?

— All the far-right parliamentary parties—Aliança Catalana, Alternative for Germany, National Reassemble, etc.—to a greater or lesser extent, and with varying degrees of cheap populism, advocate for a ruthless form of capitalism. Then there is another current, situated even further to the right, that draws from a more Nazi-fascist tradition and, theoretically, advocates for anti-capitalism. Historically, fascism presented itself as anti-capitalist and anti-socialist, and proposed the famous Third Way. But the reality is that fascist experiments ended up developing capitalism. Even in Spain, a dictatorship of fascist inspiration, the so-called developmentalism embraced a form of capitalism completely divorced from the founding Falangist ideology. This is why many Falangists consider Franco a traitor to the Falangist revolution, since the economic model had nothing to do with what Primo de Rivera preached. But in essence, they are the same. As is also the case with the left, they share common ground and points of conflict.

In his latest book, All shades of black, It explains how far-right and extreme right-wing groups operate across Europe.

— With this book I wanted to show that everything beyond the conventional right wing forms a very broad ideological family, with many internal differences and contradictions that we must understand and take into account if we want to fight the greatest enemy of democracy.

Why that title?

— It stems from the recurring imitation of colors, even those of the left, with the aim of recruiting militants. This already occurred with classical fascism. In Germany, for example, the Nazis wore brown shirts simply because the party managed to obtain a batch of cheap fabric in that color when it lacked resources. It's as simple—and as absurd—as that. Every country has its color. I chose this title to explain that black, especially in Italy, is often associated with fascism, but it has many nuances. The Falange, for example, imitated the brick blue of factory workers' uniforms and at the same time adopted the black and red of the CNT flag to capitalize on the discontent of a segment of the labor movement with the left wing of the time.

Today, there are workers who use xenophobic rhetoric against migrants and the LGBTQ+ community. Has this always been the case historically?

— It has always been this way. Hatred and frustration are inherent to human beings, regardless of their economic status. And those in power have always been adept at dividing the working class and finding a group to blame for all ills. The far-right's worldview is divided between people who fear losing what they have and those who fear social competition. This was clearly seen a few weeks ago in Badalona, ​​when more than 400 undocumented immigrants were evicted from abandoned warehouses because they had nowhere else to live. The buildings were located in a very impoverished neighborhood, with substandard housing from which people leaned out of the windows to hurl insults. The profile of those who booed the evicted people was clear: people with few resources and very harsh living conditions. This happens because those in power are happy to create scapegoats, and the far right is especially adept at this. If you can convince someone that they can't make ends meet because there are immigrants and not because their employer hasn't given them a raise in ten years, you've made a masterstroke.